81 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
81 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
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date: '2022-12-13T08:23:35'
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hypothesis-meta:
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created: '2022-12-13T08:23:35.919113+00:00'
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document:
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title:
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- "Skill and self-knowledge: empirical refutation of the dual-burden account of\
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\ the Dunning\u2013Kruger effect | Royal Society Open Science"
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group: __world__
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id: cFHoSnq_Ee2D6xvNIG1bgw
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links:
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html: https://hypothes.is/a/cFHoSnq_Ee2D6xvNIG1bgw
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incontext: https://hyp.is/cFHoSnq_Ee2D6xvNIG1bgw/royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.191727
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json: https://hypothes.is/api/annotations/cFHoSnq_Ee2D6xvNIG1bgw
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- acct:ravenscroftj@hypothes.is
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- acct:ravenscroftj@hypothes.is
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tags:
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- psychology
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- exact: "For many intellectual tasks, the people with the least skill overestimate\
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\ themselves the most, a pattern popularly known as the Dunning\u2013Kruger\
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\ effect (DKE). The dominant account of this effect depends on the idea that\
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\ assessing the quality of one's performance (metacognition) requires the\
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\ same mental resources as task performance itself (cognition). Unskilled\
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\ people are said to suffer a dual burden: they lack the cognitive resources\
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\ to perform well, and this deprives them of metacognitive insight into their\
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\ failings. In this Registered Report, we applied recently developed methods\
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\ for the measurement of metacognition to a matrix reasoning task, to test\
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\ the dual-burden account. Metacognitive sensitivity (information exploited\
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\ by metacognition) tracked performance closely, so less information was exploited\
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\ by the metacognitive judgements of poor performers; but metacognitive efficiency\
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\ (quality of metacognitive processing itself) was unrelated to performance.\
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\ Metacognitive bias (overall tendency towards high or low confidence) was\
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\ positively associated with performance, so poor performers were appropriately\
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\ less confident\u2014not more confident\u2014than good performers. Crucially,\
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\ these metacognitive factors did not cause the DKE pattern, which was driven\
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\ overwhelmingly by performance scores. These results refute the dual-burden\
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\ account and suggest that the classic DKE is a statistical regression artefact\
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\ that tells us nothing much about metacognition."
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prefix: "t\n \n \n \n\nAbstract"
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suffix: '1. Introduction1.1. Skill and '
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type: TextQuoteSelector
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source: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.191727
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text: The Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE) seems to be a statistical regression artefact
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that doesn't actually explain whether people who are good at a task are able to
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estimate their own abilities at the task
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updated: '2022-12-13T08:23:35.919113+00:00'
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uri: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.191727
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user: acct:ravenscroftj@hypothes.is
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user_info:
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display_name: James Ravenscroft
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in-reply-to: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/rsos.191727
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tags:
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- psychology
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- hypothesis
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type: annotation
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url: /annotations/2022/12/13/1670919815
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---
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<blockquote>For many intellectual tasks, the people with the least skill overestimate themselves the most, a pattern popularly known as the Dunning–Kruger effect (DKE). The dominant account of this effect depends on the idea that assessing the quality of one's performance (metacognition) requires the same mental resources as task performance itself (cognition). Unskilled people are said to suffer a dual burden: they lack the cognitive resources to perform well, and this deprives them of metacognitive insight into their failings. In this Registered Report, we applied recently developed methods for the measurement of metacognition to a matrix reasoning task, to test the dual-burden account. Metacognitive sensitivity (information exploited by metacognition) tracked performance closely, so less information was exploited by the metacognitive judgements of poor performers; but metacognitive efficiency (quality of metacognitive processing itself) was unrelated to performance. Metacognitive bias (overall tendency towards high or low confidence) was positively associated with performance, so poor performers were appropriately less confident—not more confident—than good performers. Crucially, these metacognitive factors did not cause the DKE pattern, which was driven overwhelmingly by performance scores. These results refute the dual-burden account and suggest that the classic DKE is a statistical regression artefact that tells us nothing much about metacognition.</blockquote>The Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE) seems to be a statistical regression artefact that doesn't actually explain whether people who are good at a task are able to estimate their own abilities at the task
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